It's a pity that your output is so low, because it's worth a read. I came here in hope after reading your excellent comments at Eric Schwitzgebel's substack.
Fears for the future aren't worrying. Fears are emotions and worrying is a type of problem-solving thinking.
Thank you Michael! I do mean to continue writing posts that people want to read. And those AI “Deep Dives” provide another incentive since I’ve been so impressed with the product, and yet they require nothing of me except good post text. But in truth writing blog posts doesn’t come naturally to me. Instead I’m far more suited to commenting on the posts of others. Fortunately I am enjoying this particular blog a great deal regardless of how slow I’ve been. In truth I’ve been engaged in too much interesting commentary to dedicate time to writing a next post. I guess if someone wants to see more of my writing they could follow my commentary. I always restack my comments for any potential followers to see if they like. Here’s the involved comment I left today responding to my buddy Mark. https://open.substack.com/pub/suzitravis/p/does-the-mind-need-a-body?r=5674xw&utm_campaign=comment-list-share-cta&utm_medium=web&comments=true&commentId=125870087
I’m inclined to agree with you that it’s helpful to separate “fear” from “worry”. Fear might be considered a type of punishing sensation while worry could be considered a more generic punishment that also suggests an action motivation for thought, as you imply. We might also say that people in fear, pain, or other negative feelings tend to be provided with worries of coming fear, pain, and so on. So it should be useful to keep the worry term separate.
I didn't know you had started a Substack. Welcome!
It sounds to me like the present self doesn't exist as much as we think it does if it's always comported towards the future or the past. I wonder what life would be like without memory? It's hard to imagine. Even people with dementia have some memory. Memory does seem to be an important aspect in establishing some sort of enduring self.
I wonder what you think of "flourishing" or "happiness" (as in Aristotle) in the place of "hedonism"? That's what it sounds like you're describing, something broad and long-term. I think of hedonism as being short-sighted in pursuit of mere pleasures.
I’m saying that each moment brings a new self, and it’s inherently only concerned about how good/bad it feels in the now. Memory helps this seem continuous with past selves however. Then hope and worry helps this seem continuous with future selves because they reward and punish the present self essentially forcing it to invest in the welfare of future selves. Without hope and worry we display apathy and so stop being concerned about what will happen.
The reason that I included a “hedonism” reference rather than something more socially acceptable as you suggest, is because I’m trying to get to an idea that goes beyond our various moral notions. I believe that there is a physics that constitutes the value of existing for anything regardless of human judgement. Notice that philosophers technically reside over the domain of value as a whole, and yet only talk about the rightness and wrongness of our behavior (or at least beyond aesthetics, which they don’t talk much about). While I don’t exactly mind moral discussions, shouldn’t some philosophers go deeper into the value of existing in itself? What constitutes the value of your existence to you? Here I don’t mean the arbitrary opinions people have, but rather something that value could essentially be made of. I believe this exists as how good/bad one feels from moment to moment, and as a naturalist I think this should even be objectively measurable (probably as an electromagnetic field). Regardless I’d like to use this idea to found psychology so it can become a hard science following the lead of economics. I’m trying to write a dedicated post out about this so hopefully that will help.
It sounds like you're saying the self as we ordinarily think of it is an illusion, then? That it is "mere" memory of the past with an investment towards the future?
"Notice that philosophers technically reside over the domain of value as a whole, and yet only talk about the rightness and wrongness of our behavior."
Today's largely analytically-trained philosophers, yes. But they don't tend to go for virtue ethics or ancient philosophy (which is pretty much the only way I think about morality anymore). That said, I don't doubt this would be inadequate for shaping a physicalist moral theory. You might want to check out Colin McGinn's blog. I dimly recall him talking about this.
I guess you’re right Tina, I would say that the standard conception people have of being the same essential self over time, is an illusion. Furthermore my proposal about what tends to bond their separate selves over time, is quite testable. So I’d hope for this account to be considered practically.
“That said, I don't doubt this would be inadequate for shaping a physicalist moral theory.”
It seems to me that virtue ethics serves the needs of physicalists reasonably well in a moral capacity. (My understanding of it is that virtuous intentions are all that matter here, and so not exactly what ends up happening since that might not go as well as intended. This is opposed to deontology, where specific rules must be followed, as well as utilitarianism, where all that matters is the net effect on social happiness.). But actually what I’m talking about goes deeper than any brand of morality. Consider this:
We don’t generally say that birds, reptiles, or even mice function morally, or even that they “should” function morally. Imagine someone judging birds on the basis of Kantian deontology! Though morality should be too advanced for most or all non-humans, can existence still be good or bad to such creatures themselves? The vast majority of us seem to think so. So what constitutes how good or bad their lives happen to be to them? We generally presume that feeling good causes existence to be good for them, while feeling bad causes existence to be bad for them. So this is an idea that I consider more fundamental than our various moral notions. And even though there is clearly a goodness to badness for existing as a human as well, I don’t know of any philosophers that talk about this more fundamental concept of value. It doesn’t even have a name that I know of. And whatever it is that has caused philosophers even from the ancient Greeks to ignore the value of existing in itself, this probably also causes psychologists to ignore this concept as well. I believe that in order for psychology to become a hard form of science, it will need to begin incorporating this idea into its models to reside as conscious motivation. Hopefully my next post will present an effective case.
"My understanding of it is that virtuous intentions are all that matter here, and so not exactly what ends up happening since that might not go as well as intended."
That's a bit too narrow. For instance, Aristotle emphasizes habits—we are what we habitually do. So there, it's not clear whether intentions count for much. I might intend to exercise every day, but if I don't actually force myself to do it and until I make it a habit, then my intentions don't count for much.
Another difference between the way we talk about ethics today and the way the ancient philosophers talked about it has to do with scope. The ancients thought of virtue not in the Victorian sense (that's what the word 'virtue' brings to my mind), but in the broader sense of 'living the good life'. Living the good life isn't entirely up to the individual. You have to be born in the right place at the right time, given the right education and social environment in which to thrive—there's a degree of luck involved. Plato would say you have to have the wisdom to know what to do with the luck that comes your way. Aristotle would say you have to form good habits, do the right things to make yourself the sort of person you should be, and this golden mean is relative to the individual. They have a great deal more to say about this, of course. I think the ancients were actually more sophisticated than we are when it comes to ethics in that they saw past the idea of coming up with a universal system of rules to live by. Life is far too complicated for that, each situation is different.
"And even though there is clearly a goodness to badness for existing as a human as well, I don’t know of any philosophers that talk about this more fundamental concept of value. It doesn’t even have a name that I know of."
Again, if I understand you right, Aristotle talks explicitly about this. (I prefer Plato of course, but I think Aristotle would be more to your liking). The name: eudaimonia, which is "flourishing", "happiness", or "living the good life".
You make a great case Tina! The ancient Greeks were in a sense where western academia began, and maybe under this pristine state they had the option of thinking about the value of existing in itself. Perhaps it was the massive effect of coming Christianity that’s transformed human thought on value to the judgmental “rightness to wrongness of behavior” concept that’s so entrenched today? Instead of gods with petty human jealousies and such, there came this supreme supposedly perfect judge who would either reward people with Heaven for living as He decreed, or punish people to Hell for disobedience. Under “8. Pleasure” in that SEP article you suggested, the point I made last time was completely refuted since Aristotle considered even non-human life to seek pleasure. And yes, it could be that Aristotle was more this way than most. That he was able to go this way at all however says something important to me. This doesn’t mean that I think I need to read his writings for insight, but I will adjust my sense of history in this regard.
Hopefully this weekend I’ll be able to sort out a worthy post about how the value of existing is more fundamental than standard talk of the rightness to wrongness of behavior. But to hit the point of this post home I like that you brought up exercise. From my perspective, it’s natural for a person to be angry with past selves because they didn’t set the present one up well enough. If only those former selves would have worked out every day then I’d now be in good shape. They let me down! And why should I now work out since this will not actually help me but rather future selves that aren’t me? Thus people can slide into all sorts of unhealthy situations.
The best cure is hope since it feels good right now. If you have hope that your life will get better by means of exercise, or eating more healthily, or with a side business, or anything else, then this will make associated activities feel better presently. The problem can be finding things to do that seem extra hopeful. The other cure is worry. If you know how bad it is for you to not exercise, or eat healthily, or not make extra money, then you might be incited to do such things in order to alleviate your worry somewhat. I think this understanding ought to be an essential component of psychology today. The problem is that it depends upon the premise that happiness constitutes the value of existing, or a foundation that seems missing in most of academia today.
So your (finite) image generator thinks it can create something unique! :)
I'm with you that self only exists instantaneously (ie for about 80ms) (the awareness inhabiting my brain when I read that also agreed). And actually there's no independent evidence that one's self moves thru time, or that it stays in the same body if it does. These are just things we decide to believe to make sense of our lives, but the universe doesn't owe us lives that make sense.
Instantaneous existance may also solve what I'm calling "the infinity trap". If there are an infinite number of potential "selfs" how did I get lucky enough to be instantiated as a member of a finite species? But I guess the number of instants is finite too. That just leaves the quantum multiverse.
Maybe it only seems like there are an infinite number of potential selves to us, though ontologically everything that happens is causally mandated to occur exactly as it does?
In any case I’d say that we’re lucky when we’re happy and unlucky when we’re unhappy. If I’m right that value is ultimately all that we are in the end, then without this dynamic we shouldn’t effectively exist. Regardless of whether my existence is good luck or bad luck to me however, I do consider the occurrence ridiculously improbable. I guess it’s like your existence to you. I’m not troubled by such improbability however. In an amazingly complex and enduring causal world, all sorts of funky crap should happen. Am I the most improbable of that funky crap? It ought to seem that way to me, though I doubt it in general.
"without this dynamic we shouldn’t effectively exist" - yes (well "maybe" anyway) but that only creates you in the third person.
I don't mean I/you is/are one of an infinite number of possible instantiations of me/you. That's easily dismissed as they're all equally improbable (more or less) and I/you had to be one of them. I mean the step before that: how it was that I/you were lucky enough to be "chosen" for instantiation?
To be in the first person your spirit has to be chosen from the infinite number of potential spirits, unless you can come up with a reason why there should be a finite pool (and not just a smaller pool pulled out of the infinite pool). (This is the universal equivalent of Doomsday Argument)
It's a pity that your output is so low, because it's worth a read. I came here in hope after reading your excellent comments at Eric Schwitzgebel's substack.
Fears for the future aren't worrying. Fears are emotions and worrying is a type of problem-solving thinking.
Thank you Michael! I do mean to continue writing posts that people want to read. And those AI “Deep Dives” provide another incentive since I’ve been so impressed with the product, and yet they require nothing of me except good post text. But in truth writing blog posts doesn’t come naturally to me. Instead I’m far more suited to commenting on the posts of others. Fortunately I am enjoying this particular blog a great deal regardless of how slow I’ve been. In truth I’ve been engaged in too much interesting commentary to dedicate time to writing a next post. I guess if someone wants to see more of my writing they could follow my commentary. I always restack my comments for any potential followers to see if they like. Here’s the involved comment I left today responding to my buddy Mark. https://open.substack.com/pub/suzitravis/p/does-the-mind-need-a-body?r=5674xw&utm_campaign=comment-list-share-cta&utm_medium=web&comments=true&commentId=125870087
I’m inclined to agree with you that it’s helpful to separate “fear” from “worry”. Fear might be considered a type of punishing sensation while worry could be considered a more generic punishment that also suggests an action motivation for thought, as you imply. We might also say that people in fear, pain, or other negative feelings tend to be provided with worries of coming fear, pain, and so on. So it should be useful to keep the worry term separate.
I didn't know you had started a Substack. Welcome!
It sounds to me like the present self doesn't exist as much as we think it does if it's always comported towards the future or the past. I wonder what life would be like without memory? It's hard to imagine. Even people with dementia have some memory. Memory does seem to be an important aspect in establishing some sort of enduring self.
I wonder what you think of "flourishing" or "happiness" (as in Aristotle) in the place of "hedonism"? That's what it sounds like you're describing, something broad and long-term. I think of hedonism as being short-sighted in pursuit of mere pleasures.
Thanks for your interest Tina!
I’m saying that each moment brings a new self, and it’s inherently only concerned about how good/bad it feels in the now. Memory helps this seem continuous with past selves however. Then hope and worry helps this seem continuous with future selves because they reward and punish the present self essentially forcing it to invest in the welfare of future selves. Without hope and worry we display apathy and so stop being concerned about what will happen.
The reason that I included a “hedonism” reference rather than something more socially acceptable as you suggest, is because I’m trying to get to an idea that goes beyond our various moral notions. I believe that there is a physics that constitutes the value of existing for anything regardless of human judgement. Notice that philosophers technically reside over the domain of value as a whole, and yet only talk about the rightness and wrongness of our behavior (or at least beyond aesthetics, which they don’t talk much about). While I don’t exactly mind moral discussions, shouldn’t some philosophers go deeper into the value of existing in itself? What constitutes the value of your existence to you? Here I don’t mean the arbitrary opinions people have, but rather something that value could essentially be made of. I believe this exists as how good/bad one feels from moment to moment, and as a naturalist I think this should even be objectively measurable (probably as an electromagnetic field). Regardless I’d like to use this idea to found psychology so it can become a hard science following the lead of economics. I’m trying to write a dedicated post out about this so hopefully that will help.
It sounds like you're saying the self as we ordinarily think of it is an illusion, then? That it is "mere" memory of the past with an investment towards the future?
"Notice that philosophers technically reside over the domain of value as a whole, and yet only talk about the rightness and wrongness of our behavior."
Today's largely analytically-trained philosophers, yes. But they don't tend to go for virtue ethics or ancient philosophy (which is pretty much the only way I think about morality anymore). That said, I don't doubt this would be inadequate for shaping a physicalist moral theory. You might want to check out Colin McGinn's blog. I dimly recall him talking about this.
I guess you’re right Tina, I would say that the standard conception people have of being the same essential self over time, is an illusion. Furthermore my proposal about what tends to bond their separate selves over time, is quite testable. So I’d hope for this account to be considered practically.
“That said, I don't doubt this would be inadequate for shaping a physicalist moral theory.”
It seems to me that virtue ethics serves the needs of physicalists reasonably well in a moral capacity. (My understanding of it is that virtuous intentions are all that matter here, and so not exactly what ends up happening since that might not go as well as intended. This is opposed to deontology, where specific rules must be followed, as well as utilitarianism, where all that matters is the net effect on social happiness.). But actually what I’m talking about goes deeper than any brand of morality. Consider this:
We don’t generally say that birds, reptiles, or even mice function morally, or even that they “should” function morally. Imagine someone judging birds on the basis of Kantian deontology! Though morality should be too advanced for most or all non-humans, can existence still be good or bad to such creatures themselves? The vast majority of us seem to think so. So what constitutes how good or bad their lives happen to be to them? We generally presume that feeling good causes existence to be good for them, while feeling bad causes existence to be bad for them. So this is an idea that I consider more fundamental than our various moral notions. And even though there is clearly a goodness to badness for existing as a human as well, I don’t know of any philosophers that talk about this more fundamental concept of value. It doesn’t even have a name that I know of. And whatever it is that has caused philosophers even from the ancient Greeks to ignore the value of existing in itself, this probably also causes psychologists to ignore this concept as well. I believe that in order for psychology to become a hard form of science, it will need to begin incorporating this idea into its models to reside as conscious motivation. Hopefully my next post will present an effective case.
"My understanding of it is that virtuous intentions are all that matter here, and so not exactly what ends up happening since that might not go as well as intended."
That's a bit too narrow. For instance, Aristotle emphasizes habits—we are what we habitually do. So there, it's not clear whether intentions count for much. I might intend to exercise every day, but if I don't actually force myself to do it and until I make it a habit, then my intentions don't count for much.
Another difference between the way we talk about ethics today and the way the ancient philosophers talked about it has to do with scope. The ancients thought of virtue not in the Victorian sense (that's what the word 'virtue' brings to my mind), but in the broader sense of 'living the good life'. Living the good life isn't entirely up to the individual. You have to be born in the right place at the right time, given the right education and social environment in which to thrive—there's a degree of luck involved. Plato would say you have to have the wisdom to know what to do with the luck that comes your way. Aristotle would say you have to form good habits, do the right things to make yourself the sort of person you should be, and this golden mean is relative to the individual. They have a great deal more to say about this, of course. I think the ancients were actually more sophisticated than we are when it comes to ethics in that they saw past the idea of coming up with a universal system of rules to live by. Life is far too complicated for that, each situation is different.
"And even though there is clearly a goodness to badness for existing as a human as well, I don’t know of any philosophers that talk about this more fundamental concept of value. It doesn’t even have a name that I know of."
Again, if I understand you right, Aristotle talks explicitly about this. (I prefer Plato of course, but I think Aristotle would be more to your liking). The name: eudaimonia, which is "flourishing", "happiness", or "living the good life".
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/
You make a great case Tina! The ancient Greeks were in a sense where western academia began, and maybe under this pristine state they had the option of thinking about the value of existing in itself. Perhaps it was the massive effect of coming Christianity that’s transformed human thought on value to the judgmental “rightness to wrongness of behavior” concept that’s so entrenched today? Instead of gods with petty human jealousies and such, there came this supreme supposedly perfect judge who would either reward people with Heaven for living as He decreed, or punish people to Hell for disobedience. Under “8. Pleasure” in that SEP article you suggested, the point I made last time was completely refuted since Aristotle considered even non-human life to seek pleasure. And yes, it could be that Aristotle was more this way than most. That he was able to go this way at all however says something important to me. This doesn’t mean that I think I need to read his writings for insight, but I will adjust my sense of history in this regard.
Hopefully this weekend I’ll be able to sort out a worthy post about how the value of existing is more fundamental than standard talk of the rightness to wrongness of behavior. But to hit the point of this post home I like that you brought up exercise. From my perspective, it’s natural for a person to be angry with past selves because they didn’t set the present one up well enough. If only those former selves would have worked out every day then I’d now be in good shape. They let me down! And why should I now work out since this will not actually help me but rather future selves that aren’t me? Thus people can slide into all sorts of unhealthy situations.
The best cure is hope since it feels good right now. If you have hope that your life will get better by means of exercise, or eating more healthily, or with a side business, or anything else, then this will make associated activities feel better presently. The problem can be finding things to do that seem extra hopeful. The other cure is worry. If you know how bad it is for you to not exercise, or eat healthily, or not make extra money, then you might be incited to do such things in order to alleviate your worry somewhat. I think this understanding ought to be an essential component of psychology today. The problem is that it depends upon the premise that happiness constitutes the value of existing, or a foundation that seems missing in most of academia today.
So your (finite) image generator thinks it can create something unique! :)
I'm with you that self only exists instantaneously (ie for about 80ms) (the awareness inhabiting my brain when I read that also agreed). And actually there's no independent evidence that one's self moves thru time, or that it stays in the same body if it does. These are just things we decide to believe to make sense of our lives, but the universe doesn't owe us lives that make sense.
Instantaneous existance may also solve what I'm calling "the infinity trap". If there are an infinite number of potential "selfs" how did I get lucky enough to be instantiated as a member of a finite species? But I guess the number of instants is finite too. That just leaves the quantum multiverse.
Maybe it only seems like there are an infinite number of potential selves to us, though ontologically everything that happens is causally mandated to occur exactly as it does?
In any case I’d say that we’re lucky when we’re happy and unlucky when we’re unhappy. If I’m right that value is ultimately all that we are in the end, then without this dynamic we shouldn’t effectively exist. Regardless of whether my existence is good luck or bad luck to me however, I do consider the occurrence ridiculously improbable. I guess it’s like your existence to you. I’m not troubled by such improbability however. In an amazingly complex and enduring causal world, all sorts of funky crap should happen. Am I the most improbable of that funky crap? It ought to seem that way to me, though I doubt it in general.
"without this dynamic we shouldn’t effectively exist" - yes (well "maybe" anyway) but that only creates you in the third person.
I don't mean I/you is/are one of an infinite number of possible instantiations of me/you. That's easily dismissed as they're all equally improbable (more or less) and I/you had to be one of them. I mean the step before that: how it was that I/you were lucky enough to be "chosen" for instantiation?
To be in the first person your spirit has to be chosen from the infinite number of potential spirits, unless you can come up with a reason why there should be a finite pool (and not just a smaller pool pulled out of the infinite pool). (This is the universal equivalent of Doomsday Argument)